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Mexican Policy Dilemmas: 
During the De La Madrid Presidency 
By Robert L. Looney• 
Introduction. The year 1978 represented the beginning of a 
period of rapid economic growth in Mexico. Fueled by rising 
oil revenues, foreign loans and investments, together ~th 
relative political stability, Mexican investment, consumption, 
and income rose at impressive rates. By the early 1980's how-
ever, the growth process had faltered. Rural emigration, rising 
inflation, and declining productivity were but a few of the 
problems which prompted a major economic crisis in Febru-
ary 1982. Indeed, to many observers, the phenomenal oil 
revenues only exacerbated many of the long standing prob-
lems facing Mexico. 
On November 10, 1982, the Mexican government an-
nounced an agreement with the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) on a program to ease the nation's mounting foreign 
debt. Under this "letter of intent" signed with the IMF, Mex-
ico could receive a credit of up to $3.84 billion from the Fund 
during the next three years on the condition that the govern-
ment reduce the deficit, raise taxes, and curb imports.1 • 
The recent slowdown in economic growth caused by Mex-
ico's initial austerity measures has already affected the U.S. 
economy. For example, in 1982 exports from the U.S. to 
Mexico declined by nearly $6 billion from a year earlier. It 
was estimated that this resulted in a loss of approximately 
150,000 jobs in the U.S. and had a major impact on the eco-
nomic recovery that had been predicted for the third quarter 
of 1982. U.S. Administration economists have recently pre-
dicted that because of the debt problems of Mexico and other 
developing countries, the 1983 trade deficit will be between 
•Associate Professor, Naval Postgraduate School. 
1 
"IMF Austerity Prescriptions Could be Hazardous," Business Week, 
February 21, 1983, p. 112. 
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$10 and $20 billion larger than in 1982-a loss equal to about 
0.5% of the nation's GNP.2 
The recent avalanche of major government policy initia-
tives which have been published by the new administration 
has led many observers of the Mexican economy to look at 
1983 with both caution and concern. On the one hand there 
is hope for a marked improvement in economic performance 
but on the other hand concern that the economy will continue 
to exhibit the customary shocks and surprises. 
The purpose of this paper is to identify some of the major 
macroeconomic variables that should prove to be reliable in-
dicators of the country's medium-term economic prospects. 
These indicators have been developed from a larger study a on 
the feasibility of the stabilization program as suggested in 
the letter of intent. After developing a macroeconomic model 
of the Mexican economy, using the procedure of optimal con-
trol, several simulations of the economy were conducted.' 
Each simulation represented a different mix of policy options 
available to the Mexican government or modifications to the 
IMF program. The effects of each program on economic vari-
ables such as inflation, growth and investment rates, and the 
deficit/Gross National Product ratio are examined. The main 
finding of the paper is that if Mexico is concerned only with 
meeting the narrowest of goals suggested in the IMF letter, 
recurring crises are quite likely to continue into the future. 
However, if major tax reforms are enacted at the same time, 
our model suggests that the Mexican economy could easily 
return to a high growth path by the end of the De la· Madrid 
presidency. 
The Current Crisis. Mexico's current economic problems 
can be traced to both external and internal factors. 5 Primary 
2 As outlines in IMF Survey (January 28, 1983), pp. 1-2. 
8 Cf. Robert E. Looney, "The Oil Question and Policy Optimization in 
Mexico," Paper presented at the Eastern Economic Association Meetings, 
Washington, D.C. (April 29, 1982); and Robert E. Looney and P. C. 
Frederiksen, "Optimal Stabilization Programs for Mexico in the 1980s," 
Paper presented at the North American Economic Association Annual 
Meetings, New York (December 29, 1982). 
4 Further details of the macroeconomic model can be obtained from 
the authors on request. 
5 William R. Cline, "Mexica's Crisis, The World's Peril," Foreign 
Policy (Winter-Spring, 1983), pp. 107-108. 
MEXICAN POLICY DILEMMAS 33 
among the most recent external causes were a weakening of 
the world market for oil and higher international interest 
rates. While oil exports are still important, they only amounted 
to $14 billion in 1981 instead of the $20 billion anticipated by 
the government. ° Furthermore, the increasing world interest 
rates, combined with rising debt, drove the interest burden 
from $5.4 billion in 1980 to $8.2 billion in 1981. 
Internal policies adopted by the government tended to ex-
acerbate the problem. While the country's ambitious growth 
policy resulted in average real income growth of 8.2 percent 
between 1978 and 1981, the long-term growth capacity of. 
the economy was only approximately 6 percent. The result as 
expected was increased inflation. With an apparent unwilling-
ness to reform the tax system, budget deficits had reached 16 
percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 1982. In addi-
tion, the authorities maintained a fixed exchange rate for 
most of the 1977-1980 period in spite of a 23 percent anual 
inflation. As a result of the overvalued exchange rate non-oil 
exports stagnated. 
In February 1982, the Bank of Mexico withdrew from the 
dollar market and allowed the peso to float freely. Tiiere was 
an immediate 30 percent depreciation of the currency fol-
lowed by another 18 percent devaluation in May 1982. At the 
same time, the government instituted a program of "self-
discipline" styled after IMF programs. The program did not, 
however, involve the IMF. Some of the measures enacted in-
cluded: a reduction of the deficit GNP ratio, price controls on 
certain basic and industrial products, limits on public and 
private sector imports, and nationalization of banks in Sep-
tember 1982. 
While well structured, the program was by and large un-
successful. This was especially true in the key area of public 
finance since apparently the government was unwilling to 
sacrifice government expenditures and limit further credit 
expansion. Unable to raise enough capital in financial mar-
kets, the government approached the IMF in the summer of 
1982 for a major loan. 
On November 10, 1982, a letter of intent was signed by the 
6 Basil Caplan, "Mexico-The World's New Biggest Borrower," The 
Banker (July, 1982), p. 33. 
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IMF and Mexico. While only a first step in a final IMF loan 
package, the letter outlined a three year economic adjustment 
program for Mexico. The main thrust of the letter was to re-
duce the size of the deficit which was at its highest level ever 
in 1982-16.5 percent of GDP. Specifically the letter 7 called 
for deficit to GNP ratios of 8.5, 5.5 and 3.5 percent in 1983, 
1984, and 1985-87, respectively. This of course implies major 
cuts in public expenditures. In addition, the country made a 
specific commitment that the debt, now at approximately $60 
billion, would not increase by more than $5 billion in 1983. 
The Mexican government initially rejected the Fund's pro-
posal to remove exchange controls, eliminate the three tier 
exchange rate system, or raise domestic interest rates. How-
ever, the government has now apparently agreed to a com-
promise on each point. Incremental movements towards the 
Fund's position will be implemented over time. 
As of February 1983 the government was trying to put the 
finishing touches on a $5 billion dollar syndicated private 
loan, specified by International Monetary Fund as a condition 
for IMF assistance. For the first time in history, the IMF tied 
its aid to successful completion of this syndicated loan-the 
amount being calculated on the basis of the percentage of 
foreign financing the Mexican government will be allowed to 
apply toward its budget deficit. 
Clearly what began in early 1982 as a short run liquidity 
problem for the country has turned into a longer term finan-
cial crisis of major magnitude with the advent of declining 
petroleum prices. Mexican officials conceded that, ·for every 
dollar drop in the price of oil the country stands to lose at 
least $500 million dollars per year in export revenues. This. 
is a significant sum considering Bank of Mexico forecasts of 
total dollar trade income during 1983 around $21.5 billion 
dollars including.$15 billion in oil revenues, $5 billion in non-
oil exports and $1.5 billion net. intake froni tourism (due 
primarily to drastically reduced expenditures by Mexicans 
traveling abroad). 
An even bleaker picture has been painted by the Finance 
and Public Credit Secretariat (SHCP). SHCP has estimated 
that foreign currency needs during 1983, including foreign 
7 As outlined in IMF Survey, January 28, 1983, pp. 1-2. 
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interest payments of $13 billion dollars owed by the public 
and private sector, nominal repayments on foreign loan prin-
cipal and imports of essential parts and raw materials as well 
as foodstuffs, will amount to $31.30 billion dollars. SHCP ex-
pects net new foreign loans of $5.36 billion dollars (including 
the $1.3 billion dollar first installment on the three year IMF 
loan, the $5 billion dollar private syndicated loan, U.S. gov-
ernment supported commodity credits of $760 million dol-
lars, credits from foreign suppliers of $1.19 billion dollars, and 
credits and financial supports from the World Bank and the 
Inter American Development Bank, and other world leaders 
worth some $600 million dollars. On the negative side of the 
balance sheet, the SHCP plans to repay $2.19 billion dollars 
against loans extended last year by the Bank of International 
Settlements and the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank, and to direct 
another $2 billion dollars to "accumulations of international 
reserves." 
On the basis of SHCP's analysis of these trends, a "basic" 
foreign currency deficit of nearly $4.2 billion dollars has been 
budgeted for 1983. This deficit must be accommodated by 
private sector free market purchases of foreign• currency 
(made outside the Mexican banking system)-or by a further 
reduction in anticipated private sector imports, and the pro-
duction cutbacks that this implies. 
Obviously, a steep drop in oil prices would severely threaten 
the Government's delicate current account balancing act. Gov-
ernment officials, however, have thus far attempted at least in 
public comments to downplay the possible ramifications of an 
oil price war. The Bank of Mexico has, for example, noted 
that a $3 dollar per barrel price slump would only affect 10 
percent of total expected oil revenues. In this particular case, 
"only affecting 10 percent" would mean a drop in projected 
oil export revenues during 1983 of approximately $1.5 billion 
dollars, thus producing an extremely damaging blow to the 
country's overall reserves position. 
On the brighter side, there is a certain margin for error 
in the IMF prescription for Mexico. For example, the $1.5 to 
$2 billion dollars designated for foreign reserve replenishment 
could be drawn upon in an emergency. Moreover, negotiators 
from the IMF and Mexico assumed that the country would 
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pay an interest rate of 14 percent on foreign loans throughout 
1983. Falling world interest rates will result in a substantially 
lower effective rate with each percent drop in interest rates 
saving the country $600 million for the year as a whole. The 
possibility remains that the deflationary pressures of an oil 
price drop will even accelerate the declining trend in interest 
rates. 
Furthermore, early in February IMF member countries 
agreed to boost the organization's emergency lending fund by 
47.5 percent, equivalent to some $31 billion dollars to help 
shore up debtor nations that could go into deflate. At least 
theoretically, the decision could mean additional IMF bail-out 
credits for Mexico, over and above those originally approved 
on December 23, 1982. 
The De la Madrid Policy Response. The De la Madrid Ad-
ministration has begun to deal with the economic crisis and in 
doing so, identified five major areas of priortty: 8 
1. inflation; 
2. balancing the country's various foreign accounts; 
3. generating savings to recapitalize a financially depleted 
economy; 
4. job creation; 
5. building confidence in the government's ability to man-
age the present crisis and in general stabilizing the overall 
economic situation; and 
6. defining the role of the state in Mexico's mixed economy. 
The administration has moved quickly in its anti-inflation 
efforts-demonstrating a dogged willingness to take politi- -
cally unpopular though economically necessary steps such as 
lifting price controls, reducing government subsidies, slowing 
monetary growth somewhat and adopting a conservative sal-
ary and wage policy toward government workers as well as in 
the official minimum wage. 
An even more difficult task ahead is for the government to 
balance its foreign acounts in order to generate the resources 
-- needed-to pay foreign debt interest payments, pay for essential 
imports such as foodstuffs, and begin to rebuild its interna-
tional reserves. To this end, the government will have to re-
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shuffle its mix of policies as a result of declining although yet 
to be determined oil export revenues. The common package 
of measures such as increasing export revenues, dcreasing im-
ports, obtaining new foreign debt and restructuring overall 
foreign debt will be much harder to achieve than when the 
government had hoped would be the case at the end of 1982. 
The De la Madrid administration plans to substantially in-
crease its crude oil production and exports in 1983 although 
these plans could be seriously crimped by the current near 
term outlook for the world petroleum market. 
While PEMEX is forecasting crude production in 1983 tp 
average approximately 2.85 million barrels a day with exports 
averaging at least 1.5 million b/d and hopefully a bit more, 
actual rates may be considerably lower, particularly when 
member nations of OPEC are facing new world market pres-
sures to cut back both on production volume and export 
prices. 
Meanwhile it has been estimated that just in order to main-
tain planned export levels-in other words, at least 1.5 million 
b/d will require PEMEX capital investments of at least 240 
billion ( 1980) pesos, in the 1983-88 period. That projection, 
which could translate to closer to 600 billion, measured in 
current pesos-compares with PEMEX capital investments 
totaling 344.4 billion pesos in the 1975-81 period, of which 
150.1 billion ( 43.6 percent) was represented by imports. 
Unfortunately, the decline in oil export revenues is occuring 
at a time when the government is still without any type of 
export promotional plan, and when cumbersome export pro-
cedures only act to impede rather than stimulate exports. Fur-
thermore, having export prices transacted at an unfavorable 
controlled exchange rate instead of the "free" rate is· another 
disincentive for 'exports, and negates the advantages that 
could be gained from the three major peso devaluations oc-
curring during 1982. The ever increasing estimates for 1983 
for grain imports and declining export revenues have caused 
public policy to shift more toward cutting non-food imports. 
The consequent decline in intermediate inputs will most 
likely cause gross domestic product growth to decline in real 
terms even more than the percent initially projected after the 
December 1982 signing of the IMF stabilization agreement. · 
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Another key area the government was counting on to help 
balance their current account and restore a degree of eco-
nomic stability was to secure new foreign loans above and 
beyond the still being negotiated $5 billion jumbo loan and 
restructuring overall foreign debt to win a brief respite from 
interest and principal payments obligations in 1983. These 
restructuring efforts and new loan solicitations come precisely 
at a time wh.en the international financial community has 
begun to grow ever more nervous about the loans already made 
to developing countries and the declining flow of petrodollars 
that are normally recycled in the form of loans to these in-
debted nations. In other words, it is quite possible that inter-
national credit flows to Mexico could decline very quickly. At 
best, whatever new loans are secured will be acquired at 
greater financial cost as well as with stricter loan conditions. 
The nationwide long term importance to "recapitalize" the 
financially depleted economy rests upon reattracting capital 
that left the country in recent years, particularly in 1982, and 
perhaps more importantly the ability to attract new foreign 
investment into the country. In fact, direct foreign investment 
is perhaps the only realistic source of capital and technology 
available that could generate enough resources for the coun-
try to satisfy population and employment needs as well as 
setting the stage for a new period of sustained economic 
growth not dependent upon foreign creditors. In this respect, 
however, there has been little in the way of initiatives taken 
in the first two months of the De la Madrid presidency. 
What appears to be needed is an honest assessment of the 
extent of the damage suffered by Mexico since August 1982 
with respect to its ability to attract foreign investment on the 
scale needed and desired. The taboos broken by the previous 
administration (nationalization of the banks, exchange con-
trols, closing of "Mex-dollar" accounts, a tightened transfer 
of technology law, higher taxes and clamps on profit remit-
tances) are factors which appear to have made a lasting im-
pression in the minds of many corporation directeors who are 
now shopping around for more advantageous sites for their 
foreign operations. Modifications in current laws may not go 
far enough towards reversing the negative attitude increas-
ingly held by many foreign investors vis a vis Mexico. 
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Apart from attempting to attract capital from external 
sources, the government has taken steps to reverse the de-
capitalization of the Mexican banking sector. Policies have 
resulted in increases in interest rates to levels that encourage 
savings. These policies have replaced the vague and dangerous 
"populist" notion in vogue during Lopez Portillo's last year of 
lowering interest rates in an inflationary period. The restruc-
turing of the Value Added Tax to discourage consumption and 
shift personal income into savings is also a welcome albeit 
painful sign-although the new VAT structure has not been 
as tough as some observers had hoped to see. 
A more subtle yet crucial challenge facing the government 
is its ability to instill confidence, in its efforts to come to grips 
with the present crisis and in general stabilize the situation 
for at least the remainder of 1983. To its credit, the Adminis-
tration has appointed professional government officials to key 
posts indicating that few political compromises were likely 
struck. There were also symbolic positive steps in the govern-
ment's efforts to inform and educate the general public of the 
full gravity of the country's economic and liquidity crisis. 
Furthermore, a government criticized in some quarters as 
being cooly technocratic has demonstrated politically astute 
capacity to distribute the pain or austerity equally among the 
different economic and social groups in the country. The 
packaging of higher taxes, conservative wage policies and 
policies and other measures have caused every sector to feel 
the brunt of austerity without reacting by charging unfair 
treatment. The political astuteness of the government however 
will no doubt be in greater need as the country enters a sus-
tainerl period of economic recession. 
In the area of employment, the De la Madrid Ad:tninistra-
tion hopes to create between 500,000 and 700,000 new (albeit 
temporary) ·jobs in 1983 evenly divided between rural areas 
and "critical urban areas." The ambitious 400 billion peso 
four point program also aims to protect the nation's produc-
tive plant and to create an obligatory social service system to 
absorb some 40,000 recent college graduates. Finally, the pro-
gram extends to 6 months the amount of time unemployed 
workers and their families remain eligible for Social Security 
( IMSS) medical services and related benefits. · 
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Up to 350,000 new jobs are to be created, at least tem-
porarily, in depressed rural zones in 12 different states, pri-
marily through intensified "pick and shovel" construction and 
maintenance of highways and rural access roads. Other proj-
ects include railway maintenance work, irrigation system ex-
pansion, reforestation efforts, maritime labor, river control 
and the expansion of farm sector cooperatives. 
Supporting. the urban and rural employment projects will 
be a concerted government effort to preserve the existing pro-
ductive plant. In large part the underlying strategy is based 
on re-orienting public expenditure toward the domestic mar-
ket, providing fiscal stimulants and adequate foreign currency 
and establishing the means to pay off private sector debt. 
Through those programs the De la Madrid Administration 
hopes to avert new bankruptcies and lay offs. Small and 
medium sized industries will be able to turn to the government 
development bank N acional Financiera, via its specialized 
FOGAIN trust for low cost peso credit lines. FOGAIN hopes to 
make available 53 billion pesos in credit for small and me-
dium industry in 1983 in the perhaps exaggerated hope of 
eventually creating 180,000 new jobs in the manufacturing 
sector. 
The Energy Employment Program should effectively defuse 
social tensions caused by the drastic contraction in Mexico's 
economy. On the other hand, Federal employment programs 
of such a massive scale often lead to accelerated inflation and 
little GNP growth. The classic Keynesian solution of "putting 
some men to work digging holes, and others to work filling 
them" may· be effective in a time of falling prices and Federal 
budget surpluses. With Mexico's hyperinflation and severe 
budget deficit however, such a program might do more harm 
than good, even though significant improvements in housing 
and in the transportation infrastructure might result. 
Interestingly enough the jobs program dramatized how 
truly little is known about the scope and composition of Mex-
ican unemployment. Officially, only 8 percent of the nation's 
work force is currently (early 1983) looking for a job; how-
ever that figure is complicated by an estimated 40 percent of 
the work force that is sub employed. Further clouding the 
issue, Mexico's diverse opposition parties and labor factions 
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tend to quote only figures that they find useful. Thus while the 
opposition parties place unemployment at more than ten mil-
lion (or nearly 50 percent, assuming a theoretic labor force 
of 22 million), the government controlled labor confederation 
estimates that the 700,000 jobs to be created by the Emer-
gency Program will represent 2/3 of those currently unem-
ployed. 
Whatever the figure, which no doubt lies somewhere be-
tween the two quoted, unemployment is certain to be a con-
tinuing issue throughout the De la Madrid presidency. What 
is not certain as yet is to what extent his new Emergency Jobs 
Program will effectively alleviate the problem. · 
Finally, in attempting to delineate the role and function of 
the state, the De la Madrid administration sponsored a bill in 
the Chamber of Deputies in late December 1982 granting the 
title "economic rector" to the Federal government. The Senate 
also passed the initiative which clarifies the government's 
activities in the country's so-called "mixed economy." 
A special Chamber of Deputies Commission justified the 
amendments on the basis of historical precedents, as well as 
because of "the level of economic development and the density 
and complexity reached by Mexican society and by the ac-
cumulation of its contradictions." Also cited was "an eco-
nomic crisis of structural dimensions-inscribed in the most 
profound world crisis since the depression of 1929." 
The changes and amendments to the Mexican Constitution 
make explicit "the rectorial function of the state in develop-
ment" while at the same time establishing a "national plan-
ning system to give coherence to the economic participation" 
in the planning, thus-at least officially-giving various sec-
tors of society an increased voice in the economic· develop-
ment policy making process while also fortifying the role of 
'the Congress. Finally, the proposed Constitutional changes 
"fix the bases for an integrated rural development, and for 
improved agrarian justice." 
Given the traditionally strong-indeed heavy handed role 
played by the Mexican state in economic matters, some ob-
8 Based on accounts in American Chamber of Commerce of Mexico, 
Mexico Update (December 27, 1982); January 14, 1983; January .31, 
1983; and February 11, 1983). 
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servers have downplayed the significance of the Constitutional 
Reforms. They point out that ex-President Lopez Portillo na-
tionalized the Mexican banking system first, then later modi-
fied the Constitution to legalize this action. Other government 
initiatives affecting the private sector have been equally 
abrupt-and equally binding. 
Nonetheless, a constitutional reform of this magnitude and 
at this critical point in ·Mexican socio-economic history raises 
questions about the country's future economic and political 
evolution, within the Mexico economy approach. The Admin-
istration has yet to declare its intentions toward the hundreds 
of private companies it acquired along with bank nationaliza-
tion. Nor has the Administration's specific attitude toward 
foreign investment been articulated. The recent Constitutional 
reforms, even if only symbolic in nature, are nevertheless 
adding to the already charged atmosphere of uncertainty. 
Clearly it is too early to evaluate the effect the De la Madrid 
policies will have on the economy over the next few years. At 
present, there is however widespread concern in Mexico, 
especially among politicians, that the policies embodied in 
the IMF Program could in and of themselves lead to negative 
growth rates in the economy during 1983 and perhaps be-
yond. To examine whether or not this fear is justified, several 
simulations of the economy were conducted under different 
assumptions as to policy mix. The model and the results of 
the simulations are described below. 
Various Stabilization Programs. The two main policy vari-
ables in the model developed for this analysis are (a) govern-
ment investment (the chief instrument of fiscal policy) and 
(b) the Bank of Mexico credit to the government. The tech-
nique of optimal control theory was employed to derive the 
optimum policy mix associated with each set of predetermined 
targets. That is to say in each simulation an objective was 
§pecified, and policies .were evaluated in terms. of the trade-
offs associated with their resultant growth path ·over the 
1982-87 period. 9 
9 The model's exogenous variables were set at the following rates to 
reflect in large part historical movements: (a) an exchange rate: 90 
pesos to the U.S. dollar, (b) the rate of increase in the crude petroleum 
index: 6%, (c) growth of crude petroleum exports: 6% per annum, 
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The effectiveness of each stabilization program is measured 
by the value of seven important economic variables. The seven 
variables are the average annual growth rates from 1982 to 
1987 for (a) private consumption, (2) private investment, 
(3) total investment (private plus government investment in 
addition to inventory changes), (4) GDP, (5) the 1987 ex-
ternal borrowing requirement (exports minus imports) in 
billions of 1975 pesos, (6) the 1987 rate of inflation, and 
(7) the 1987 deficit GNP ratio. 
The ''baseline scenario" is the mildest option open to the 
government. This program assumes a status quo of the econ-
omy and inasmuch assumes no agreement has been reached 
with the IMF. Existing policies are thus extended, and deficits 
are not controlled. The objective is to maximize real GNP by 
1978 but at the same time to reduce the inflation rate to 20 
percent. The result in terms of these seven variables for the 
baseline scenario are presented in Column ( 1), Table 1. 
As indicated, the inflation rate is below 18% by 1987 and 
at the same time the deficit/GNP ratio has stabilized at ap-
proximately 11.5 percent. However, the external "gap" (vari-
ble 5) would reach 84.1 billion pesos by 1987-olearly in-
feasible from Mexico's point of view. 
TABLE I 
Effect of Various Stabilization Programs 
on Selected Economic Variables 
Economic Variable 
(1) Private Consumption a 
(2) Private Investment a 
(3) Total Investment a 
(4) Gross Domestic Product a 
(5) 1987 External Borrowing Rate b 
(6) 1987 Inflation Rate 
(7) Deficit/GNP Ratio % 
Baseline 
Scenario 
6.2 
5.9 
6.4 
5.9 
-84.1 
17.4 
11.5 
a Average Annual Growth Rate, 1981-87, Percent 
b Billions of 1975 Pesos 
Programs 
IMF Letter 
of Intent 
3.5 
-4.1 
-3.0 
2.3 
0 
6.0 
3.5 
IMF Letter 
with Tax 
Reform 
4.8 
. 1.4 
2.1 
4.2 
-27.3 
3.9 
0.6 
The second stabilization program-the IMF Letter of Intent 
Program-represents a fairly severe stabilization effort. The 
major constraints explicitly outlined by the November 1982 
(d) growth of U.S. Gross Domestic Product: 2.5% per annum, and (e) 
growth of U.S. consumer price index: 6% per annum. 
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letter of intent are that the deficit/GNP ratio is to be fixed at 
8.5%, 5.5% and 3.5% for 1983, 1984, and 1985-87 respec-
tively. The letter of intent was interpreted to imply an infla-
tion goal of less than 10% by 1987 and government borrow-
ing and Bank of Mexico credit be constrained to a 5% average 
annual increase between 1981 and 1987~ Given these con-
straints, government investment is reduced by the model to a 
level which still maximizes the real GDP in 1987. 
As can be seen Column ( 2), Table 1, strict adherence to 
the letter of intent program would represent a fairly severe 
shock to the Mexican economy. Despite a positive rate of 
growth for GDP and a 6 percent rate of inflation, both private 
and total investment experience negative growth rates over the 
time period examined. This result is due to the entire em-
phasis being placed on reductions in government expenditures 
to meet the deficit targets. 
An alternative program open to the government is to in-
troduce some form of tax reform concomitant with reductions 
in government expenditures. Thus the burden of reaching 
specified deficit targets is spread between less government 
spending and increases in tax revenues. Assuming that the 
autehorities have the political will to reform part of the tax 
structure, the second program outlined above was rerun with 
the additional constraint that government revenues were to 
increase at an average annual rate of 15 percent between 
1982 and 1987. 
The results of this program appear in Column (3), Table 1 
and indicate the beneficial effects of some form of tax reform. 
Private investment, total investment, and GDP increase at 
average annual rates of 1.4, 2.1, and 4.2 percent, respectively. 
In addition, the inflation rate is reduced to under 4 percent. 
More importantly however, the external gap declines to 27.3 
billion pesos-an average annual decline of approximately 11 
percent since 1981. Furthermore, this program is consistent 
with increases in the standard of living-private consumption 
expands at an annual rate of 4.8 percent. 
In short post-devaluation ( 1982) fiscal policy will require a 
restricted level of government expenditure. This is particularly 
true for current (operating) expenditures. It is also extremely 
important to treat investment outlays with care: substantial 
and indiscriminate reductions risk would most likely jeopard-
ize the longer term growth of the economy. It goes without 
saying that the government will have to install procedures to 
ensure that investment projects are authorized according to a 
strict order of priority. 
In terms of taxes, one of the characteristics of the Mexican 
tax system until quite recently was the almost unitary elas-
ticity of tax collection; i.e., tax revenuee fluctuated only 
slightly above the nominal GDP. Recent reforms have at-
tempt to increase the rate of tax collection at a rate more 
rapidly than the nominal product (in order to strengthen its 
effect as an automatic stabilizer). Hopefully, this will give 
the authorities greater scope and ability to reduce inflationary 
pressures while providing funds to meet the priorities of the 
national budget. 
Policy Options. Realistically, quantitative forecasts present-
ed above are somewhat problematical. Accurate assessments 
concerning the country's medium term prospects will be pos-
sible only after the new administration has a year or so to 
outline its modifications in the country's development strategy 
and when the confusion generated by the recent exchange rate 
adjustments is dissipated. 
However, the Mexican economy will probably evolve along 
one of three possible courses in the coming years : 10 
1. variable inflation, with slow growth and fluctuations of 
the "stop-go" type; 
2. recession, with declining inflation and increasing unem-
ployment, and 
3. moderate growth, with stable, or perhaps even declining 
inflation. 
Alternative three is obviously the government's choice, and 
one shown in the previous section to be feasible, while course 
1 is more or less the current state of affairs. Alternative 2 is 
the presumed result of the relatively strict International Mone-
tary Fund type program outlined above. This latter option can 
10 A . ·1 s1m1 ar assessment was made by L. Solis for the period following 
the 1976 devaluation and stabilization nrogram. See his "The External 
Sector o fthe Mexican Economy,'' in Joseph Grunwald, ed., Latin Am-
e~ca and _the ~orld Economy: A Changing International Order (Beverly 
Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1978), pp. 133-146. 
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be rejected more ar less out of hand as a likely outcome 
simply because experience has shown that more often than 
not this policy mix has led to strong social tensions which in 
time become uncontainable producing drastic policy changes. 
The net result is often an unstable path of the first alternative 
(the "stop-go" type); i.e., it appears that in choosing volun-
tary deflation, countries condemn themselves to inflation; in 
both cases forces are unleashed which make it necessary to 
rectify the direction of economic policy and this leads to un-
stable policy impacts. Interestingly enough, it appears that 
from the Latin American experience at least a pattern seems 
to develop whereby when successive corrections are made, 
they generally occur within increasingly short periods of time 
and thus destabilize the economic 'indicators on which com-
panies and investors must make decisions. Clearly, the prob-
lem becomes serious when changes of direction take place 
befare the economic system adapts to the previously estab-
lished set of conditions; i.e., an increasingly unstable situation 
of the "stop-go" type character is likely to occur. 
The pattern Mexico seems to be currently falling into and 
one in which the new administration must make every at-
tempt possible to avoid is one where credit and public expendi-
tures rise, thus increasing the real demand pressure upon re-
sources accelerating the rate of price increase, and increasing 
the balance of payments deficit. The deficit in turn eventually 
forces reductions in credit and public expenditures but only 
after the situation has reached a stage whereby only extreme 
contractions in expenditure will reverse the process. This in 
turn reduces economic activity, and the process begins again 
in what seems to be a vicious cycle. 
Currently developing in the Mexican case are a series of 
conflicts: ( 1) foreign debt; (2) wages and other domestic 
income, and (3) in general, the national purchasing power, 
all of which threaten to set off the self-perpetuating process 
of "stop-go" instability outlined above. This conflict may arise 
because the "stop-go" process is clearly operating by modify-
ing the consumers' real income, altering the surpluses avail-
able for export, and reducing investment. In other words, the 
current economic policies in Mexico are in real danger of 
losing any semblance of continuing. Obviously, unless re-
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versed the resulting instability will result in lower rates of 
private investment and a deceleration in the long run trend 
of potential real GDP growth. 
Whatever shortcomings "stabilizing development" had as 
an economic policy in its heyday between 1955 and 1970, it 
was a coherent strategy, enabling the private sector to adapt 
to the prevailing conditions. This sector did respond by under-
taking long term projects (which would have most likely been 
impossible in the presence of a "stop-go" instability). 
Given the current ( 1983) Mexican economic situation it is 
urgently necessary to reduce any incompatibility between the 
balance of payments and the growth of real GDP. To achieve 
this two associated conditions are necessary.11 
1. The peso must not be overvalued, especially far long 
periods of time. 
2. The level of wages and other domestic incomes must not 
be separated from the conditions that prevail in the markets 
for labor, capital, and other factors of production. 
Incompatibilities in Policy Objectives. Examination of Mex-
ico's major economic objectives has revealed a number of 
additional potential incompatibilities. 12 In large part resolu-
tion of the apparent trade-offs inherent in the country's de-
velopment form the basis of the ongoing debate within Mexico 
on economic and social development in general, and on trade 
in particular. Growth rates of 8 percent per year have shown 
a tendency to cause inflation to rise significantly above the 
U.S. level, undermining both income disfribution and manu-
facturing export goals (because of an increasingly overvalued 
peso). Mexico's inflation rate was around 30 percent in 1981 
11 Further elaboration on these points is contained in Robert Looney, 
"The Oil Question and Policy Optimization in Mexico," Paper presented 
at the Eighth Annual Convention of the Eastern Economic Association, 
Washington, D.C., April 29, 1982. 
12 See al~o Sidney WE:intraub, "Case Study of Economic Stabilization: 
Mexico," in William R. Cline and S. Weintraub, eds., Economic Stabiliza-
tion in Developing Countries (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1981 ), 
pp. 272-295; Laurence Whitehead, "Mexico From Bust to Boom: A 
Political Evaluation of the 1976-79 Stabilization Programme," World 
Development (November 1980); and Leopoldo Solis, "The Petroleum 
Boom in Mexico: An Opportunity for Correcting the Pattern of Eco-
nomic Development," Paper presented at the North American Economic 
Studies Association Meetings, Mexico City, December 28, 1978. 
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probably exceeding 100 percent in 1982. Supply constraints, 
bottlenecks and lack of monetary controls have thus resulted in 
a close link between high rates of growth and rapid increases 
in inflation. 
Rapid growth has also hampered the development of a 
domestic capital goods industry as the overvaluation of the 
peso resulting from growth induced inflation made imports of 
capital goods relatively attractive. Similarly, rapid growth 
through its inflationary and exchange rate effects signifi.-
can tly reduced the attractiveness of Mexican goods exports. 
Mexico is thus taking on many of the aspects of a mono-
export economy. 18 
The trade-off between industry ap.d agricultµre implicit in 
the Global Development Plan (GDP), the National Industrial 
Development Plan (NIDP) and the Mexican Food System 
(SAM) 14 is still not yet fully apparent. The NIDP was drawn 
up without much emphasis on agriculture. On the other hand, 
SAM and the GDP did not fully integrate planning in all sec-
tors when re-emphasizing agriculture. It is clear upon a care-
ful reading of the plans, however, that they represent mare of 
a compilation of the different perspectives of several minis-
tries, and are not in any true sense an integration of these 
perspectives. 
One apparent trade-off between industry and agriculture in 
the NIDP is a gap in projected productivity between the two 
sectors, with agriculture significantly lagging behind indus-
try. This discrepancy has been addressed to some extent by the 
subsequent publication of the GDP and the Mexican Food 
System (SAM) plans. 
Both the GDP and SAM emphasize agriculture to the extent 
that: 
1. rates of 4 percent higher than that projected in the 
NDIP are now the official targets for the sector; 
1s Similar to the process described in Jahangir Amuzegar, "Oil Wealth: 
A Very Mixed Blessing," Foreign Affairs (Spring 1982.), pp. 814-835. 
14 Cf; Calvin Blair, "Economic Development Policy in Mexico: A New 
Penchant for Planning," Institute of Latin American Studies, the Uni-
versity of Texas at Austin, Technical Papers Series No. 26 (1980) for 
a:n excellent summary and comparison of the plans. 
15 Carlos Benito, "Policies for Food Production and Consumption in 
Underdevelopment: The Case of Mexico," Journal of Policy Modeling 
(1979), pp. 383-398. 
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2. self-sufficiency in corn and beans by the end of 1982 
is a major target; 
3. an increase in agricultural investment over the period 
1980-82, sufficient to bring the sector's allocation uo to 22 
percent of total public investment, is now a major objective; 
4. self-sufficiency in other basic foods by the end of the 
1980s is an explicit government objective, and 
5. significant reforms in food prices, credit, packaging, 
transportation and tractor production are anticipated. 
The resolution of priorities and the means best suited to 
attain the country's development objectives will sooner or 
later force the government to define more clearly its view of 
the future structure of Mexican societv, the country's rela-
tionship with the U.S. and its role in the international eco-
nomic system; i.e., will the country opt for a model of inde-
pendent nationalist develooment or one of full integration 
into the international economic system? 
The nationalist/internationalist debate stems 18 directly 
from the general ideological tendencies and divisions which 
characterize the Mexican political system. In very general 
terms Mexican nationalists tend to emphasize: ( 1) petroleum 
conservation; (2) diversification of markets away from the 
U.S.; (3) continued use of non-tariff protection methods (anti-
GATT); (4) development of basic foods rather than export 
agriculture; ( 5) a relatively large government role in the 
economy; and ( 6) heavy expenditure on social programs. In 
sharp contrast Mexican internationalists tend to stress the 
desirability of: ( 1) high levels of petroleum production; (2) 
expansion rather than diversification of markets; (3) closer 
relationships with the U.S.; ( 4) opening the economy more 
rapidly to import competition as the best way of developing 
competitive industries (pro-GATT); (5) the encouragement 
of comparative advantage forces in agriculture; (6) reliance 
on the private sector for continued growth, and (7) trickle 
down theories of income distribution. 
The internationalist position is a composite of views. The 
complete set of policies outlined above is not advocated by any 
19 Cf. E.V.K. Fitzgerald, "Recent Writings on the Mexican Economy," 
Lati.n American Research Review (1981), pp. 236-244, for a summary 
of this debate. 
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one person or group but is rather the general attitude of many 
leading technocrats in the government. 
In practice current ( 1983) policy is a mix of the two 
themes, leading toward somewhat the nationalist side. 
If things turn out well, Mexico will be able to achieve zero 
real growth in 1983. While an IMF Stabilization Program 
with tax reform would most likely return the economy to a 
stable, moderate growth rate, it is clear that if the unpopular 
reforms facing President Elect de la Madrid are delayed, wa-
tered down, or ignored, Mexico's monetary crisis will become 
a long term economic crisis. It is still unclear what effects 
Mexico's financial difficulties will have on popular action. In 
the United States, newspaper and television documentaries 
have made forecasts of convulsive, even revolutionary political 
events. Such predictions seem based on a misunderstanding of 
Mexico. Mexico may be a country of nationalists, but it is also 
a country of patriots. Unlike the intellectuals who attempt to 
speak for them, the common people of Mexico (and even 
much of the middle class) are quite conservative. As one ob-
server has recently noted, "No one has made money for many 
decades by betting against the Mexican political elite's in-
stinct for self-preservation. If a political change does arrive, it 
is more likely to come through a change of sentiment than a 
change of leaders. Mexico has a history of great disappoint-
ments. An interruption of the rise to mass prosperity may be 
among the most unnecessary of these, but it would not seem 
to be the most bitter." 11 
Conclusions. Traditionally, the failure of the Mexican eco-
nomic growth has been analyzed from two different perspec-
tives. On the one hand is the view held by Tello, 18 Lustig,19_ 
and Reynolds ~0 who believe that the country suffers from a 
. . 
n Nick Eberstadt. "La Crisis,'' New Republic (October 18, 1982.), 
p. 2.1. . 
18 Tello, La Politica Econamica in Mexico, 1970-76 (Mexico City: 
Siglo XXI, 1979). 
19 Nora Lustig, "Characteristics of Mexican Economic Growth," ]our· 
nal of Development Econamics (1982.), pp. 355-376. 
20 Clark Reynolds, The Mexican Econamy (New Haven: Yale Uni-
versity Press, 1970); and C. Reynolds, "The Mexican Economy 1982... 
1987: Key Issues, Policy Alternatives, and Implications for International 
Business," in Alice Lentz, Country Risk Analysis: Mexico (San Fran-
cisco: FMME, 1982). 
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number of structural problems. These include a low quality 
labor force, a basically untrained entrepreneurial labor force, 
an inefficient public sector, an undeveloped capital market, 
and an inelastic tax system. In this regard, it is felt that the 
solutions are long-term in nature. Inasmuch, they require 
careful planning and a substantial resource allocation by the 
government to each sector of the economy. 
An alternative approach, which is followed in this paper, 
has been suggested by Beltran del Rio 21 and Looney. 22 While 
recognizing the longer term structural problems facing the 
country, they suggest that Mexico's problems should be solved 
through some mix of fiscal and monetary policy with a major 
emphasis on tax reform. Thus, the current crisis, while seri-
ous, can be viewed as a·temporary financial "imbalance." The 
solutions are short-term in nature, and seem to be viable 
options for the present government. Thus, the prospects for 
future economic stability in Mexico depend on the willingness 
and ability of the government in power to enact the necessary 
monetary and fiscal reforms. 28 
Under the best circumstances, it will take several years for 
the economy to get on track again. Private investment will 
most likely fall below its 1981 level for two or three years, 
with possibly even larger declines in the living standards of 
wide segments of the population. And, under the best of cir-
cumstances, it would be difficult for a president in the Mex-
ican political system to endure the costs of keeping harsh 
economic policies in force for several years in a row. How 
much more difficult it will be if these unpopular reforms are 
resisted by influential groups from within and demanded from 
aboard by unpopular foreign (IMF) powers is anyone's guess. 
21 Abel Beltran del Rio, "Mexico's Troubled Economy: Peso Prognosis," 
Wharto~ Magazine (Winter 1977), pp. 55-56; "Econometric Forecasting 
for Mexico: An Analysis of Errors in Prediction," in J. Behrman and 
J. Hanson, Short Term Macroeconomic Policy in Latin America (Cam-
bridge: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1979); and "The Mexican Oil Syn-
drome: Early Symptoms, Preventive Efforts and Prognosis," in W. 
Braer and M. Gillis, Export Diversification and the New Protectionism: 
The Experiences of Latin America (Urbana-Champaign: Bureau of Eco-
nomic and Business Research, 1981 ), pp. 115-130. 
22 Robert Looney, Mexico's Economy: A Policy Analysis (Boulder 
Colorado: Westview Press, 1978). ' 
28 Leopoldo Solis, Economic Policy Reform in Mexico: A Case Study 
for Developing Countries (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981). 
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As noted, Mexico's financial crisis was caused in part by 
the world oil glut. The likely decline in world petroleum ex-
port prices which could represent a major obstacle to the 
success of the country's stabilization effort, i.e., a drop iri 
Mexico's oil export revenues could well force a rethinking of 
current government austerity policies-if not the adoption of 
more severe measures in the areas of government spending, 
import reductions, dollar availability and servicing the public 
sector foreign debt. 
The analysis above did indicate however that a new eco-
nomic policy can be structured in a manner capable of estab-
lishing a pattern of growth able to overcome the limitations of 
the 1971-81 period of stop-go inflationary growth. While tech-
nically feasible, the success of this policy will ultimately de-
pend on the De la Madrid Administration's political will for 
implementation. 
